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HANDLE WITH CARE: FORD MOTOR CO. V. MONTANA
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
AND ITS EFFECT ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
BUT-FOR TEST
Dimitrios Tsolakidis*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,1 the
Court gave special consideration to the second part of its disjunctive, “arise
out of or relate to,” test for the relatedness prong of specific jurisdiction.2
By isolating the “relates to” disjunct, the Court held a corporation is subject
to personal jurisdiction in any state where its product injures a consumer if
the corporation has expansive contacts that systematically serve a market
for the injury-causing product in the forum state.3
Ford Motor Co. poses a challenge for the Ninth Circuit: Did the
Court’s opinion abrogate the Ninth Circuit’s but-for test for determining
relatedness? Courts in but-for jurisdictions have so far answered this question inconsistently.4 Until recently, district courts in the Ninth Circuit were
* Dimitrios Tsolakidis is a 2021 graduate of the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the
University of Montana. This Comment was first drafted in May 2021 and revised to reflect updated case
law in October 2021. The author thanks Lauren Moose for her early advice and edits, and her continuing
support and encouragement, and the board and staff of the Montana Law Review.
1. 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
2. Id. at 1026; Id. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring); Id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). This Comment uses “relatedness” to refer to the second prong of the three-prong test for the constitutionality of
specific jurisdiction as that test evolved from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), and was refined in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), and discussed in Section
II(A), infra. This use of relatedness is not the same as the more technical “arises out of or relates to”
phrase, which is analyzed in Section II(B)(3), infra. The reader should keep these two concepts separate.
3. Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (majority opinion).
4. For courts in but-for circuits that have answered the question affirmatively, see In re: Zantac
(Ranitidine) Products Liability Litigation, No. 20-MD-2924, 2021 WL 2682602, at *7–8 (S.D. Fla. June
30, 2021); Israel v. Alfa Laval, Inc., No. 8:20-CV-2133-WFJ-AAS, 2021 WL 1662770, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 28, 2021); Nomad Glob. Commun. Sols., Inc. v. Hoseline, Inc., No. CV 20-138-M-DLC, 2021 WL
1400983, at *4 (D. Mont. Apr. 14, 2021); Clarke v. Dutton Harris & Co., PLLC, No.
220CV00160JADBNW, 2021 WL 1225881, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2021); Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC, No. 19-CIV-81220-RAR, 2021 WL 1216897, at *35 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2021). For courts in
but-for jurisdictions that have suggested the but-for test is still good law, see Nationwide Agribusiness
Inc. So. v. Yuma Cty. Water Users Ass’n, No. 21-CV-78-JLS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153986, *8 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2021); TransparentBusiness, Inc. v. Infobae, No. 3:20-cv-00582-MMD-WGC, 2021 WL
2670704, at *3 (D. Nev. June 29, 2021); McHugh v. Vertical Partners W., LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00581DCN, 2021 WL 1554065, at *5 (D. Idaho Apr. 19, 2021); James Lee Constr., Inc. v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., No. CV 20-68-M-DWM, 2021 WL 1139876, at *2 (D. Mont. Mar. 25, 2021).
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also split.5 The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in passing in Ayla, LLC v.
Alya Skin Pty. Ltd.6 but has yet to fully flesh out its position.7
This Comment argues Ford Motor Co. did not abrogate the Ninth Circuit’s but-for test for determining relatedness. A precise reading of the
Court’s opinion shows Ford Motor Co. added to, rather than invalidated,
the but-for relatedness test. Federal court litigants in the Ninth Circuit
should continue advocating for use of the but-for standard. But in an exceptional case, where the but-for test fails despite the defendant’s expansive
and systematic contacts with the forum state, courts can examine the nature
of those contacts under the more forgiving relates to standard. If handled
with care, Ford Motor Co. will not significantly change the Ninth Circuit’s
specific jurisdiction jurisprudence. The but-for test will still govern the
analysis of a typical case. However, for a narrow set of cases, Ford Motor
Co. expands the types of minimum contacts that can constitutionally subject
an out-of-state corporation to a forum state’s jurisdiction.
This Comment uses Ninth Circuit precedent to illustrate the effect
Ford Motor Co. should have in this Circuit and proposes a framework that
combines the old but-for test with the new Ford Motor Co. rule. Section II
provides a necessary background on personal jurisdiction, with a special
focus on the relatedness prong of the constitutionality of specific jurisdiction. Section III analyzes the Montana Supreme Court’s and the United
States Supreme Court’s Ford Motor Co. opinions. Section IV develops the
Comment’s central thesis that Ford Motor Co. did not abrogate the Ninth
Circuit’s but-for test, and Section V concludes.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction is the power of a court to enter judgments binding
on the person or property of the defendant and to compel a defendant to
appear in court.8 The United States Constitution defines the outer bounds of
personal jurisdiction.9 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states,
“[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”10 The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Due Process Clause
applicable to the states.11 Every lawsuit triggers the Due Process Clause
5. See supra note 4.
6. No. 20-16214, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25921, *18 n.5 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021).
7. Ayla suggested a departure from the Ninth Circuit’s preferred but-for test for determining relatedness. Id. The impact of Ayla on the lower courts has yet to be seen. This Comment discusses Ayla
more in Section IV infra.
8. BROOKE D. COLEMAN, ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 83 (3d ed. 2018).
9. Victoria Dettman, Milky Whey, Inc. v. Dairy Partners, LLC: Transacting Business Under Montana’s Long-Arm Statute to the Full Constitutional Limit, 78 MONT. L. REV. 339, 340 (2017).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Id. amend. XIV; Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
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because it threatens to deprive defendants of either their liberty or property.
“At a minimum, the Due Process Clause requires that a court . . . has proper
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, has afforded the defendant appropriate notice of the action, and has given the defendant an opportunity to be
heard.”12
The analytical structure of personal jurisdiction arises directly from the
language of the Due Process Clause.13 The first question in the analysis
asks whether a state or federal court is attempting to assert power over a
person or their property.14 If yes, the Clause is triggered.15 This brings the
analysis to a second question: whether that assertion of power is compatible
with due process.16 Therefore, a court may assert personal jurisdiction over
a defendant only if two things are true: (1) the law of the forum grants the
court the power to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2)
the application of that power complies with due process—i.e., is constitutional.17 This Comment concerns the second prong—the “constitutionality”
prong—of personal jurisdiction.
Historically, the Supreme Court relied on sovereignty concepts derived
from international law to determine the extent of a court’s personal jurisdiction.18 “The states were treated like countries, each with exclusive sovereignty over its own persons or property within its territory.”19 Therefore,
initially, courts had personal jurisdiction over defendants who consented to
the power of the sovereign or whose person or property was physically
present in the forum state.20 The Court’s 1878 decision, Pennoyer v. Neff,21
solidified these two bases (consent or presence) for personal jurisdiction.22
Eventually, “[a]s commerce, transportation, and communication advanced
. . . courts expanded the bases of power beyond consent and presence.”23

12. COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 85.

R

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 83.
19. Id. at 84.
20. Id.; Dettman, supra note 9, at 340; see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722, 733–34 (1878).
21. 95 U.S. 714, 722, 733–34 (1878).
22. Dettman, supra note 9, at 340.
23. COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 84; see also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1146–47 (1966) (“The highly significant development in recent years of this form of specific jurisdiction reflects the growing mobility and
complexity of modern life . . . .”).
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Indeed, the emergence of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,24 may be
attributed, in part, to these advancements.25
A. International Shoe and the Birth of Specific Jurisdiction
International Shoe “established the framework for the current analysis
of the constitutionality of the assertion of personal jurisdiction.”26 There, a
Delaware corporation headquartered in Missouri was sued in Washington,
where it was neither physically present nor had it consented to jurisdiction.27 Under the traditional standards established by Pennoyer, the defendant would not be subject to personal jurisdiction.28 Nonetheless, the Court
upheld the Washington court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant.29
The Court in International Shoe applied the following rule:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”30

Applying this standard, the Court found the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington.31 The out-of-state corporation had “systematic and continuous” activities within Washington (e.g., employing
salespeople in Washington and doing a “large volume of interstate business”),32 and the lawsuit “arose out of those very activities.”33 Therefore,
the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation
would be “reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of
fair play and substantial justice.”34
The International Shoe Court made an important and lasting distinction between general and specific jurisdiction.35 General jurisdiction exists
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
25. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1036 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). For a more complete history lesson on the development of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, see Dettman, supra note 9, at 340–45.
26. COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 96.
27. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311–12.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 322.
30. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
31. Id. at 321.
32. Id. at 313, 320.
33. Id. at 320.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 316–18. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984). For subsequent circuit court opinions referring to the International Shoe distinction as “general”
and “specific,” see Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286–87 (9th Cir.
1977); Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Glater v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 1984); Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760
F.2d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 1985); Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1986).
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when a corporation’s activities with a state are so “continuous” and “substantial” that jurisdiction may be appropriate even if the suit does not relate
to those activities.36 Recent cases hold that, absent some exceptional circumstance, corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they
are incorporated or headquartered.37
The paradigm case of specific jurisdiction, according to International
Shoe, is where an out-of-state defendant has continuous and systematic activities within a state and those activities give rise to a lawsuit in that
state.38 Conversely, such a corporation will not be subject to personal jurisdiction when its activities within the state are isolated and unrelated to the
suit.39 More difficult determinations of specific jurisdiction arise in cases
where the defendant has isolated contacts related to the suit or substantial
but unrelated contacts.40 However, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of jurisdiction in these “difficult” cases.41 Rather, it admitted the minimum contacts test is not “mechanical” or “quantitative,” but dependent on
“the quality and nature” of the out-of-state corporation’s activities within
the state.42
Since International Shoe, the constitutionality of specific jurisdiction
demands three elements: (1) minimum contacts that show the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the state’s laws;
(2) an affiliation between the defendant’s activities within the forum state
and the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) fairness or reasonableness.43 This test “derive[s] from and reflect[s] two sets of values—treating defendants fairly and
protecting interstate federalism.”44 The central concern of Ford Motor Co.
is the second, arises out of or relates to prong—often referred to as “relatedness.”45 The following Subsection discusses this prong in more detail.
36. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9.
37. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017);
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 118
(2014).
38. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
39. Id. at 313, 320.
40. Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate
about “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1338–39 (2005).
41. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
42. Id. at 319.
43. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985) (noting specific jurisdiction requires
the defendant to “purposefully direct[ ]” activities at residents of the forum and for those activities to
give rise, or relate, to the litigation); Id. at 476–77 (requiring also that the exercise of specific jurisdiction is “reasonable” or “fair,” based on a five-factor test from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)). For a more in-depth analysis of this post-International Shoe development, see Matthew P. Demartini, Stepping Back to Move Forward: Expanding Personal Jurisdiction by
Reviving Old Practices, 67 EMORY L.J. 809, 814–22 (2018); Dettman, supra note 9, at 342–44.
44. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (citing WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
45. Andrews, supra note 40, at 1334.
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B. The Relatedness Prong
As illustrated by International Shoe, the essential feature of specific
jurisdiction is that the activities of the out-of-state defendant “give rise to
the liabilities sued on[.]”46 In the aftermath of this decision, the Court “repeatedly recognized a distinction between . . . claims that arise out of a
defendant’s activities in the forum state and . . . claims that do not concern
the defendant’s forum activities.”47 The remainder of this Subsection examines the evolution of the relatedness prong.
1. Early Development
Immediately following International Shoe, the Court habitually questioned whether an out-of-state corporation’s contacts with the forum state
are related to the cause of action for purposes of specific jurisdiction.48 In
the 1952 case, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,49 the Court
declined to apply specific jurisdiction, opting instead for a general jurisdiction analysis, because the out-of-state defendant’s activities in the forum
state were unrelated to the plaintiff’s suit.50
Five years after Perkins, the Court decided McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co.51 There, the plaintiff, a California resident, purchased
life insurance from Empire Mutual, an Arizona corporation, in 1944.52 In
1948, International Life Insurance, a Texas company, assumed Empire Mutual’s insurance obligations, including the plaintiff’s life insurance policy.53
The plaintiff died in 1950, and International Life Insurance refused to pay
his beneficiary.54 The beneficiary sued and obtained a judgment against International Life Insurance in California.55 Although International Life Insurance had no offices or agents in California and never “solicited or [transacted] any insurance business in California apart from [the plaintiff’s] pol46. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
47. Andrews, supra note 40, at 1333.
48. See Travelers Health Ass’n v. Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S.
643, 648 (1950) (upholding jurisdiction where out-of-state corporation “systematically and widely” conducted business in forum state and “caused claims for losses” there); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min.
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (declining to extend specific jurisdiction to case where “cause of action
[did] not aris[e] out of the corporation’s activities in the [forum state]”); Helicopteros Nacionales De
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984) (applying general jurisdiction where claims did not arise
out of defendant’s activities in the forum state).
49. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
50. Id. at 446.
51. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
52. Id. at 221.
53. Id. at 221–22.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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icy,”56 the Court held California’s exercise of jurisdiction was valid.57 The
Court reasoned, “It is sufficient for purposes of Due Process that the suit
was based on a contract which had substantial connection with [the forum
state].”58
Another important moment in early relatedness jurisprudence came in
1977 when Shaffer v. Heitner59 overruled Pennoyer by invalidating in rem
jurisdiction in cases where the property that “serves as the basis for statecourt jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action.”60 The Shaffer Court emphasized the central concern of personal jurisdiction: “[T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”61
2. The Effect of World-Wide Volkswagen
The development of relatedness jurisprudence continued with the 1980
case, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.62 The dispute in WorldWide Volkswagen arose from a car accident in Oklahoma.63 The plaintiffs’
allegedly defective car was manufactured by Audi in Germany,64 imported
by Volkswagen of America, distributed by World-Wide Volkswagen, and
sold to the plaintiffs by petitioner Seaway in New York.65 The Court held
Oklahoma, where the plaintiffs filed suit, could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Seaway and World-Wide Volkswagen because the plaintiff
could not establish the first prong—minimum contacts—of specific jurisdiction.66
Although the World-Wide Volkswagen opinion never explicitly addressed the relatedness prong, Justice White’s majority opinion created
some influential dicta cited by later cases in this context.67 The Court con56. Id. at 222.
57. Id. at 223.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
60. Id. at 208–09.
61. Id. at 204.
62. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
63. Id. at 288.
64. Brief for Petitioners at *3, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(No. 78-1078).
65. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
66. Id. at 295, 298–99.
67. See id. at 297. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017,
1027 (2021) (“Or said another way, if Audi and Volkswagen’s business deliberately extended into
Oklahoma . . . then Oklahoma’s courts could hold the companies accountable for a car’s [malfunctioning] there—even though the vehicle had been designed and made overseas and sold in New York”);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985) (“[T]he forum state does not exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
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ceded that when the sale of a product to a consumer arises from the manufacturer’s or distributor’s efforts to “serve directly or indirectly[ ] the market for its product in other states, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit
in one of those states” if its product injures a consumer there.68 The Court
specifically noted that, as the manufacturer, Audi would be subject to specific jurisdiction in Oklahoma69 if it served a market for its products there,
even though the plaintiffs purchased the car from a retailer in New York
with no ties to Oklahoma.70
This dictum suggests an out-of-state defendant could be subject to specific jurisdiction in any state where it “serve[s] directly or indirectly, the
market for” a product that injures a consumer, even if the defendant did not
directly sell that particular product to that particular consumer in the particular forum state.71 When interpreted as the Ford Motor Co. decision interprets it, this excerpt from World-Wide Volkswagen expands the number of
possible defendants whose minimum contacts could be deemed related to
the dispute.72
3. The Disjunctive, Arises out of or Relates to, Formulation
The year 1984 marked a formulaic shift in the Court’s articulation of
the relatedness prong. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall,73 the Court, for the first time, expressed the relatedness prong as “relate[s] to or arises out of.”74 Despite its effect on specific jurisdiction,
Helicopteros was a general jurisdiction case.75 The parties agreed that there
was no affiliation between the defendant’s forum-related activities and the
claims.76 However, the Court distinguished between specific and general
jurisdiction, stating, “When a controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ a
defendant’s contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a ‘relationship
in the forum state and those products subsequently injure forum consumers.”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (“Where, as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has
continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine.”).
68. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
69. The Court did not have a chance to formally rule on the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over Audi, the manufacturer, because only two defendants’ claims were
before the Court. Audi’s regional distributor and retail dealer petitioned the Court after their writ of
prohibition was denied in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Audi’s contacts with Oklahoma were therefore not at issue before the Court. Id. at 288–89.
70. Id. at 297–98.
71. See id. at 297.
72. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1027–28.
73. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
74. Id. at 414.
75. Id. at 415–16.
76. Id.
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among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction.”77
The precise source of this rule statement in Helicopteros is a bit of an
enigma. The Court cites Shaffer for the final clause78 of the sentence, but it
offers no direct support for the related to or arises out of language.79 In a
footnote following the Shaffer citation, the Court states, “It has been said
that when a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the state
is exercising specific jurisdiction over the defendant.”80 At the end of this
footnote, the Court cites to Arthur T. von Mehren’s and Donald T. Trautman’s law review article, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
which contains similar language.81
Although von Mehren and Trautman offer no direct support for the
rule statement, they support it indirectly through their discussion of McGee,
which framed the rule in terms of a “substantial connection,”82 and Henry
L. Doherty & Co v. Goodman,83 a pre-International Shoe case. The authors
observed Doherty was a basis for International Shoe’s “new analytical approach [permitting] the assumption of jurisdiction over any matter that
bears a reasonable and substantial connection to the forum.”84 It is also
possible this language stems from the International Shoe decision itself—
although the specific page was not cited by Helicopteros or von Mehren—
which uses the phrase, “arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state.”85 Therefore, the disjunctive, related to or arises out of,
formulation ostensibly resulted from a combination of Doherty, International Shoe, McGee, and Shaffer.
The Court continued the disjunctive formulation of the rule in the 1985
case Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,86 citing directly to Helicopteros.87 It
deviated from this language slightly in its 1990 case, Burnham v. Superior
77. Id. at 414 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
78. “[R]elationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Id. (citing Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 204).
79. See generally id. (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204). Although “arises out of” is in quotes, presumably pulled from International Shoe, which is cited in the preceding sentence, “related to” is not in
quotes.
80. Id. at 414 n.8.
81. Id.; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1144–45 (“In the case of specific jurisdiction,
the assertion of power to adjudicate is limited to matters arising out of—or intimately related to—the
affiliating circumstances on which the jurisdictional claim is based.”).
82. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1149.
83. 249 U.S. 623 (1935); see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1147, 1149–50.
84. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1147.
85. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis added).
86. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
87. Id. at 472–73.
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Court of California,88 where, citing again to Helicopteros, it seemingly
dropped the related to disjunct but kept the arising out of phrase.89 The
Court returned to the disjunctive iteration in its two 2011 personal jurisdiction cases, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro90 and Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.91 In 2014, the Court decided Walden v.
Fiore,92 a specific jurisdiction case,93 and Daimler AG v. Bauman,94 a general jurisdiction case.95 In Walden, the Court only referenced the arises out
of language, citing to Burger King Corp., which in turn was citing to
Helicopteros.96 But the Court framed the rule disjunctively again in
Daimler.97 In 2017, the Court decided Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of California,98 where it again cited Helicopteros for the proposition
that specific jurisdiction can only be exercised if the suit “arise[s] out of or
relate[s] to” the defendant’s forum-related contacts.99 Of these seven cases,
Walden and Bristol-Myers Squibb had the most profound effect on the relatedness prong. They are discussed in more detail below.
Walden exemplifies the level of proximity needed between the defendant’s suit-related conduct and the forum state in order for the exercise of
specific jurisdiction to be constitutional.100 In Walden, Nevada plaintiffs
sued a Georgia police officer for an allegedly unlawful search and seizure in
a Georgia airport and for later falsifying a probable cause affidavit and conspiring with a United States Attorney in Georgia.101 The officer had no
contacts with Nevada, directed no activities toward Nevada, but knew the
plaintiffs would suffer the effects of his actions in Nevada.102 The Court
held the officer did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada to
be subjected to Nevada’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.103 The mere fact
that the officer “directed his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Ne88. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
89. Id. at 610, 618.
90. 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011).
91. 564 U.S. 915, 923–24 (2011).
92. 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
93. Id. at 283.
94. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. at 284; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985).
97. 571 U.S. at 118 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
n.8 (1984)).
98. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
99. Id. at 1780.
100. 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014); see Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“What is needed . . . is
a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue . . . Our decision in Walden, supra,
illustrates this requirement.”).
101. 571 U.S. at 277.
102. Id. at 278.
103. Id. at 288.
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vada connections” was insufficient.104 Rather, “it is the defendant, not the
plaintiff or third parties, who must create contact within the forum state.”105
Bristol-Myers Squibb further developed the necessary connection between the defendant, the plaintiff, the claims, and the forum state. It began
as a class action filed in California by plaintiffs allegedly injured by the
drug Plavix, which is manufactured by Bristol-Myers.106 The class members consisted of 86 California residents and 592 nonresidents.107 “[T]he
nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix
in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California.”108 Bristol-Myers moved to quash service of summons on the nonresidents’ claims, contending California lacked personal jurisdiction over those claims.109 The
California Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ finding of specific jurisdiction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.110
The nonresident plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers Squibb argued California’s
exercise of specific jurisdiction over their claims was proper; Bristol-Myers
“marketed, promoted, and sold Plavix [in California] as part of a nationwide
course of conduct,” and the nonresidents’ claims were related to that conduct.111 They asserted that the Court’s disjunctive, arises out of or relates
to, formulation of the relatedness prong enlarges the scope of forum-related
activities that can establish an affiliation between the defendant’s conduct,
the forum state, and the litigation.112 The nonresident plaintiffs maintained
that, although arises out of connotes a close causal link between the defendant’s activities and the plaintiff’s claims, the relates to disjunct does not—
it is a more forgiving standard.113 Therefore, they argued, the relatedness
prong was satisfied, even though the nonresident plaintiffs obtained, used,
and were allegedly injured by Plavix outside of California.114
The Court rejected the nonresidents’ arguments and held they could
not establish the relatedness prong of specific jurisdiction.115 Specific jurisdiction requires “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the
104. Id. at 289.
105. Id. at 291.
106. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777–78 (2017).
107. Id. at 1778.
108. Id. at 1781.
109. Id. at 1778.
110. Id. at 1778–79, 1784.
111. Brief of Respondent at 47–48, 50–51, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct.
1773 (2017) (No. 16-466).
112. Id. at 17–19.
113. Id. at 18–19.
114. Id. at 47–48.
115. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782.
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forum state.”116 There was no such affiliation here, according to the Court,
because “[w]hat is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”117 Bristol-Myers only
reaches the California market through third parties; the nonresident plaintiffs suffered no harm in California; and “all the conduct giving rise to
[their] claims occurred elsewhere.”118 Therefore, the Court held, specific
jurisdiction could not be established.119
With this legal background the United States Supreme Court set out in
2021 to answer whether Ford Motor Company could be subject to specific
jurisdiction in Montana for a dispute that arose from a vehicle that was
neither manufactured nor sold to the plaintiff in Montana.
III. THE FORD MOTOR CO. DECISIONS
The underlying facts of Ford Motor Co. are as straightforward as they
are tragic. Ford assembled a 1996 Ford Explorer in Kentucky and sold the
vehicle for the first time to a dealer in Washington.120 Over ten years later,
the owner of the vehicle sold it to another consumer.121 On May 22, 2015,
that consumer’s daughter, Montana resident Markkaya Jean Gullett, crashed
the vehicle in Montana and subsequently died when one of the Explorer’s
tires suffered a tread and belt separation.122
Charles Lucero, Gullett’s personal representative, sued Ford in the
Montana Eighth Judicial District Court alleging strict product liability, strict
liability, and negligence.123 Ford moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; the district court denied its motion.124 Ford subsequently petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control.125 The
Montana Supreme Court accepted supervisory control and affirmed the district court’s denial of Ford’s motion.126 Ford then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court, which accepted certiorari on January 17, 2020.127
116. Id. at 1781 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opers. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1781–82.
119. Id. at 1782.
120. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d 407, 411 (Mont. 2019).
121. Id.; Lauren Amongero & Kevin Ness, PREVIEW; Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth
Judicial District Court: Can Corporations “Have it Their Way” Under Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
and Specific Jurisdiction Jurisprudence?, 81 MONT. L. REV. ONLINE 52 (2020), https://perma.cc/
7MMU-N8BB.
122. Ford Motor Co., 443 P.3d at 411; Dillon Kato, Superior Woman Dies in Crash Near Alberton,
MISSOULIAN (May 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/VPA6-PNVF.
123. Ford Motor Co., 443 P.3d at 411.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 418.
127. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 917 (Jan. 17, 2020).
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The Court combined Ford Motor Co. with Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer,128
on petition for a writ of certiorari from the Minnesota Supreme Court.129
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Ford’s motion
and held Montana could exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford.130
A. Montana Supreme Court Decision
In a unanimous decision, the Montana Supreme Court held Ford was
subject to personal jurisdiction in Montana.131 The Court applied the twopart framework of personal jurisdiction, finding first that the Montana longarm statute was satisfied under the tort accrual provision, and second, the
exercise of specific jurisdiction was constitutional under a stream of commerce theory.132 However, the most notable part of the opinion is the discussion of the relatedness prong of the constitutionality of specific jurisdiction.
The Court found the relatedness prong was satisfied because Lucero’s
claims against Ford related to Ford’s activities in Montana, even though
they did not directly arise out of those activities.133 The Court distinguished
Bristol-Myers Squibb, where the out-of-state plaintiffs were not prescribed,
did not use, did not ingest, and were not injured by Plavix in California—
the forum state.134 Here, conversely, “Gullett was injured while driving the
Explorer in Montana.”135 Similarly, the Court distinguished Walden.136 In
Walden, “the plaintiffs were the only connection between the defendant and
the forum state, [but] here, Gullett is by no means the only connection between Ford and Montana. Rather . . . Ford markets, sells, and services vehicles in Montana, demonstrating a willingness to sell to and serve Montana
customers[.]”137 Thus, unlike Walden and Bristol-Myers Squibb, there was
an affiliation between the defendant’s minimum contacts, the forum state,
and the litigation.
The Montana Supreme Court’s treatment of the relatedness prong was
the primary focus of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion.
128. 140 S. Ct. 916 (Jan. 17, 2020).
129. Amongero & Ness, supra note 120, at 52.
130. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2021).
131. Ford Motor Co., 443 P.3d at 418.
132. Id. at 412–13. Under Montana’s long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction is proper “as to any
claim for relief arising from . . . the commission of any act resulting in accrual within Montana of a tort
action.” MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(b)(1)(B).
133. Ford Motor Co., 443 P.3d at 416.
134. Id. at 417.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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B. United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Montana Supreme
Court’s opinion and held Ford was subject to personal jurisdiction in Montana for Lucero’s claims.138 Justice Kagan wrote the opinion of the Court;
Justices Alito and Gorsuch wrote separate concurring opinions.139
1. Petitioner Ford’s Argument
Ford argued the relatedness prong of the constitutionality of specific
jurisdiction could not be satisfied.140 Specifically, Ford claimed the relatedness prong requires the defendant’s forum-related contacts to give rise to
the lawsuit.141 Such was not the case here, according to Ford, because Ford
did not manufacture or sell the vehicle that injured the plaintiff in Montana.142
On petition for certiorari, Ford argued there is a circuit split regarding
the interpretation of the relatedness prong.143 The lack of guidance from the
Supreme Court on how much of a nexus is required between the defendant’s forum-related contacts and the plaintiff’s suit has led courts to adopt
four different approaches.144 Ford outlined these approaches in its petition:
(1) no causal connection; (2) but-for causal connection; (3) stronger causal
connection; and (4) unspecified causal connection.145 As Ford noted in its
petition, the Ninth Circuit belongs in the second camp, requiring but-for
causation,146 and Montana is in the first camp, the one with no causation
standard.147
At oral argument, Ford’s counsel, Sean Marotta, contended the Court
should apply, at a minimum, but-for causation but perhaps even a proximate
cause standard.148 That Ford advertised in Montana might be a but-for
cause of the injury, but it was not proximate enough, according to Marotta,
to supply personal jurisdiction.149 In response to Justice Sotomayor, Marotta clarified what he meant by proximate cause: “It’s that the operative
138. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021).
139. Id. at 1021, 1032, 1034 (Justice Barrett took no part in this decision).
140. Id. at 1026.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9–10, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141
S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (No. 19-368).
144. Id. at 10–11.
145. Id. at 11–16.
146. Id. at 12–13.
147. Id. at 11.
148. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S.
Ct. 1017 (2021) (No. 19-368), https://perma.cc/JMP9-EZU5 [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
149. Id. at 6–8 (Justice Roberts questioning Marotta about Ford’s advertising).
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facts of the controversy arise from the defendant’s conducts—contacts with
the state where the defendant’s in-state conduct forms an important or at
least material element of proof in the plaintiff’s case.”150 However, in closing, Marotta simply asked the Court for some causation standard, not necessarily proximate cause.151
Justice Kagan’s questioning exposed a fundamental weakness in
Ford’s causation-only approach: a plaintiff who purchases a product from a
manufacturer in state A and drives it to state B, where they are injured and
where the manufacturer is not subject to general jurisdiction, would only be
able to sue in state A or the state where the product was manufactured, even
if the manufacturer sells similar products in state B.152 Justice Kagan further questioned Marotta on Ford’s reliance on Bristol-Myers Squibb and
Walden.153 She attempted to distinguish the lack of forum-related contacts
in Walden and the lack of suit-related contacts in Bristol-Myers Squibb
from the present case, where Ford admits it purposefully availed itself in
Montana and the injury occurred in Montana.154
2. Respondent Lucero’s Argument
In his response brief, Lucero argued the Montana Supreme Court correctly analyzed the relatedness prong: the plaintiff’s claims arose from
Ford’s efforts to serve indirectly the market for its product in Montana.155
He was not required to prove, as Ford contended, a direct connection between the defendant’s actions and his claims—i.e., that Ford designed,
manufactured, or sold the vehicle in Montana.156 Lucero maintained the
Supreme Court had never required a strict causation test but rather has always framed the relatedness prong disjunctively: “arise out of or are connected with”;157 “arise out of or relate to”;158 and “deriving from or connected with.”159 Lucero further asserted that the Court already declined to
adopt a causation requirement in Bristol-Myers Squibb.160
150. Id. at 21.
151. Id. at 34.
152. Id. at 24–26.
153. Id. at 26–27.
154. Id.
155. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 23, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141
S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (No. 19-368).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 24–25 (citing International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
158. Id. at 25 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
159. Id. at 25 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opers. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)).
160. Id.
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Lucero also argued that a causation requirement would undermine
principles of personal jurisdiction.161 Specifically, Ford should have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” in a state, such as Montana,
where it actively advertises, sells, and services its vehicles.162 Therefore,
Lucero contended, “the ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ that personal jurisdiction protects are served [here.]”163 Additionally,
Lucero claimed, Montana has a “compelling interest in protecting its residents from dangerous products that are marketed and sold there.”164 It
would be “arbitrary and irrational” if Montana could not assert jurisdiction
over a manufacturer who sold dangerous products in the State simply because the particular product was manufactured and first sold in a different
state.165
3. Majority Opinion
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion begins with “our most common formulation” of the relatedness prong, which is that “the suit must arise out of
or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”166 Although the first
half of that standard “asks about causation,” the other half contemplates
some other relationship “without a causal showing.”167 However, “[t]hat
does not mean anything goes”; there are, Justice Kagan maintains, “real
limits.”168 Despite those limits, specific jurisdiction does not always require
proof of causation, as Ford contends.169
Justice Kagan defines this “other relationship” implicitly in her discussion of World-Wide Volkswagen. Specifically, she points to Justice White’s
dicta discussed in Section II(B)(2) supra of this Comment.170 Cited in full,
the excerpt from World-Wide Volkswagen states:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or
Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts
of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market
for its product in [several or all] other States, it is not unreasonable to sub161. Id. at 26.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021) (emphasis in
original).
167. Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
168. Id.
169. Id. For further support that relatedness does not always require strict causation, Justice Kagan
cites to Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opers. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011), for the proposition that “an
affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy” is all that is needed, “without demanding
that the inquiry focus on cause.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
170. Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1027.
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ject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has
there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.171

For Justice Kagan, this paragraph squarely addresses Ford’s situation in this
case. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held Oklahoma could not assert
personal jurisdiction over the New York car dealer, but it could exercise
jurisdiction over Audi, the car’s manufacturer, and Volkswagen, the nationwide importer.172 The example of Audi and Volkswagen was later used as a
“paradigm” of specific jurisdiction in Daimler.173 There, the Court stated,
“[a] California court would exercise specific jurisdiction ‘if a California
plaintiff, injured in a California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured
vehicle, sued Daimler [in that court] alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed.’”174 “Substitute Ford for Daimler,” Justice Kagan observed, “and the Court’s illustrative case becomes the . . . case[ ] before
us.”175
Having clarified the legal framework of the relatedness prong, Justice
Kagan applied it to the facts before her. First, she considered “the business
that [Ford] regularly conducts in Montana[.]”176 Ford advertised through
billboards, television, radio, direct mail, and print; sold used and new
cars—including the Ford Explorer model—throughout the state of Montana; and “work[ed] hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars’ owners”
by regularly maintaining and repairing cars through Montana dealerships,
including cars whose warranties had long expired, and distributed replacement parts to its own dealers and independent auto shops around the
State.177 All of these activities, Justice Kagan observed, “encourage
Montanans . . . to become lifelong Ford drivers.”178
Second, Justice Kagan examined Ford’s suit-related contacts in Montana. Ford advertised, sold, and serviced Ford Explorers, like the one that
injured the plaintiff, in Montana.179 “In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in Montana . . . for the very vehicle[ ] that [the plaintiff alleges] malfunctioned and injured them[.]”180 Therefore, “there is a
strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”181
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1027.
Id. at 1027–28.
Id. at 1028 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
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These facts, according to Justice Kagan, provided a “paradigm” case of how
specific jurisdiction works.182
Though Ford’s contacts clearly relate to the dispute, Justice Kagan
was reluctant to concede that causation exists here. But she did not foreclose the possibility either. It is possible that “the owners of these cars
might never have bought them, and so these suits might never have arisen,
except for Ford’s contacts with their home states.”183 For instance, they
may have made those purchases because they saw Ford advertisements, or
because Ford’s in-state activities make it convenient for them to drive a
Ford there. “The plaintiffs here did not in fact establish, or even allege, such
causal links.”184
Next, Justice Kagan continued where her colloquy with Marotta left
off and distinguished Bristol-Myers Squibb and Walden from the case
before the Court. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, there was no affiliation between
the forum and the controversy.185 In Walden, there was no affiliation between the defendant and the forum state.186 Both were inapplicable here,
according to Justice Kagan.187 Unlike Bristol-Myers Squibb, there was an
affiliation between the forum and the controversy because the plaintiff resided, purchased and used the vehicle, and was allegedly injured by the
vehicle, in Montana.188 And unlike Walden, there was an affiliation between the defendant and the forum because “Ford has a veritable truckload
of contacts with Montana . . . as it admits.”189 Therefore, both precedents
are inapposite.190
4. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito concurred solely to express his concerns with Justice Kagan’s disjunctive parsing of the phrase arises out of or relates to.191 According to him, the Court should not have altered its personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence because this case is easily decided under World-Wide Volkswagen:
If a car manufacturer makes substantial efforts to sell vehicles in States A
and B (and other States), and a defect in a vehicle first sold in State A
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id. at 1031.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring).
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causes injuries in an accident in State B, the manufacturer can be sued in
State B. That rule decides these cases.192

Although Justice Alito agreed with the holding, he took issue with the way
the majority handled Ford’s causation argument.193 Justice Alito thought
the majority went too far when it recognized “a new category of cases in
which personal jurisdiction is permitted,” namely, “those in which the
claims do not ‘arise out of’ (i.e., are not caused by) the defendant’s contacts
but nevertheless sufficiently ‘relate to’ those contacts in some undefined
way.”194
Justice Alito thought it unwise to say a causal link is not needed—and
here, he claims, there is a sufficient causal link.195 It is reasonable to infer,
he contended, that the Ford Explorer would not have been on the road but
for Ford’s activities (i.e., advertising, selling, and servicing) in Montana.196
Therefore, Lucero’s claim arises out of Ford’s contacts with the forum
state, and it is unnecessary to ask whether Ford’s contacts with Montana
relate to the dispute.197
Additionally, Justice Alito was concerned about the ramifications of
recognizing relate to as an independent basis for jurisdiction.198 He considered the phrase overly broad and likely to confuse the lower courts.199 Although the majority recognized the need for “real limits,” it did not indicate
“what those limits might be.”200 Therefore, Justice Alito would have decided this case on the arising out of language and World-Wide Volkswagen,
without altering the relatedness prong.
5. Justice Gorsuch’s Concurrence
Justice Gorsuch concurred in the decision separately, joined by Justice
Thomas.201 Most of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion took up the same issue as
Justice Alito’s: the concern that Justice Kagan’s disjunctive parsing of the
relatedness prong needlessly altered the Court’s relatedness jurisprudence.202 Justice Gorsuch was similarly troubled by the absence of guidelines, and particularly limitations, in the majority opinion.203 However, he
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1033–34.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1034.
202. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he majority asks us to parse those words as though we were
dealing with language of a statute.”).
203. Id. at 1034–35.
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went further than Justice Alito by providing some concrete examples of
how this new, stand-alone related category might stray from the fundamental notions of fairness and due process that underpin our personal jurisdiction doctrine.204 “In some cases,” he contented, “the new test may prove
more forgiving than the old causation rule . . . [but] it may also sometimes
turn out to be more demanding.”205
The first example Justice Gorsuch invited us to grapple with is one
where he considered the new test to be more demanding: whether Washington, the State where the vehicle was first sold, could exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford in this case.206 Justice Kagan implicitly foreclosed that
possibility in her majority opinion, stating, “[f]or [Washington], the suit
involves all out-of-state parties, an out-of-state accident, and out-of-state
injuries; the suit’s only connection with the State is that a former owner
once . . . bought the car there.”207 Justice Kagan used this example to show
that Ford’s causation argument, which would render Washington an appropriate forum state as the state of first-sale, would in fact “undermine, rather
than promote,” due process because Washington bears even less of a relationship to the defendant and the litigation.208 Justice Gorsuch questioned
this outcome: It would seem, he claims, that Washington has “a strong interest in ensuring [it does not] become [a] marketplace[ ] for unreasonably
dangerous products.”209 A proper causation standard would allow courts to
examine whether the dispute arises out of that first sale of the vehicle in
Washington—arguably, he maintains, it did.210
The next example came from a hypothetical in a footnote of the majority opinion.211 The hypothetical contemplates the situation in which a retiree in Maine carves and sells wooden duck decoys over the Internet, when
one of his decoys injures a consumer in another state.212 “The majority says
this hypothetical supplies a useful study in contrast with our cases.”213 Although Ford’s continuous contacts with Montana are sufficient to establish
an “affiliation” with the State, the decoy seller’s contacts may be too isolated and sporadic.214 Justice Gorsuch viewed this as a problematic example
because “between the poles of ‘continuous’ and ‘isolated’ . . . lie a virtually
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 1035.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1030 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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infinite number of ‘affiliations’ waiting to be explored.”215 By not providing some causation standard, Justice Gorsuch questioned whether the majority opinion provided any standard by which to evaluate the cases that fall
somewhere between the two extremes.216
The remainder of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion embarks on a journey
through the history of specific jurisdiction jurisprudence.217 In doing so, he
identified a central tension motivating the majority’s holding: “When a
company ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the benefits of another state’s market in the 1940s, it often involved sending in agents, advertising in local
media, or developing a network of on-the-ground dealers . . . .”218 However,
today, “even an individual retiree carving wooden decoys in Maine can
‘purposefully avail’ himself” of doing business in other states, “thanks to
internet advertising with global reach.”219 Perhaps, he wrote, that is the intuition underlying the majority’s introduction of a new rule.220
In a somewhat dramatic conclusion, Justice Gorsuch reiterated his consent to the Court’s judgment and admitted he had no real solutions to offer:
None of this is to cast doubt on the outcome of these cases . . . The real
struggle here isn’t with settling on the right outcome in these cases, but with
making sense of our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and International
Shoe’s increasingly doubtful dichotomy. On those scores, I readily admit
that I finish these cases with even more questions than I had at the start.
Hopefully, future litigants and lower courts will help us face these tangles
and sort out a responsible way to address the challenges posed by our
changing economy in light of the Constitution’s text and the lessons of history.221

For how narrow the focus of Ford Motor Co. purportedly is, Justice Gorsuch seems to foreshadow the Court’s almost inevitable dismantling of specific jurisdiction doctrine. But that will need to wait for another day and
perhaps a more appropriate case.
IV. ANALYSIS
Several jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit,222 use a but-for test
to determine whether the relatedness prong is satisfied.223 Recent district
court decisions from these jurisdictions interpreted Ford Motor Co. as an
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1036–39.
218. Id. at 1038.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1039.
222. Bullard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).
223. Id.; Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2018); Consulting Eng’rs
Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278–79 (4th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Lakeview Co., 13 P.3d 280,
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abrogation of that approach,224 while other decisions suggested the but-for
test is still in play.225 This Section argues the latter approach is the correct
reading of Ford Motor Co. Justice Kagan did not completely overrule a
causation standard in her opinion. Rather, she distinguished between the
first part of the disjunctive relatedness rule—arises out of—which does indeed “ask[ ] about causation,”226 and the second half of the rule—relates
to—which, as she noted, “contemplates some other relationship.”227 Therefore, courts in but-for jurisdictions are free to continue using the but-for test
unless presented with this “other relationship” to which Justice Kagan alludes; namely, the World-Wide Volkswagen-Daimler paradigm that “[became] . . . the case[ ] before us.”228
To illustrate what that situation will look like, this Section uses Ninth
Circuit precedent decided on a but-for standard. Specifically, Subsection
IV.A discusses the but-for standard used in the Ninth Circuit, and Subsection IV.B uses Ninth Circuit cases to illustrate how Ford Motor Co. works
in conjunction and in harmony with the but-for test. Finally, Section IV.C
discusses the shortcomings of Ayla, which, to date, is the Ninth Circuit’s
only interpretation of Ford Motor Co.’s effect on the relatedness prong of
specific jurisdiction.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s But-For Test
The Ninth Circuit “explicitly adopted” the but-for test for determining
the relatedness prong of specific jurisdiction in Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines.229 Later cases continued this trend.230 Shute arose from an injury
sustained by a Washington State resident on-board a cruise ship in interna284–85 (Ariz. 2000); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Mass. 1994); Shute v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 783 P.2d 78, 81–82 (Wash. 1989).
224. In re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Products Liability Litigation, No. 20-MD-2924, 2021 WL 2682602,
at *7–8 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2021); Israel v. Alfa Laval, Inc., No. 8:20-CV-2133-WFJ-AAS, 2021 WL
1662770, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2021); Nomad Glob. Commun. Sols., Inc. v. Hoseline, Inc., No. CV
20-138-M-DLC, 2021 WL 1400983, at *4 (D. Mont. Apr. 14, 2021); Clarke v. Dutton Harris & Co.,
PLLC, No. 220CV00160JADBNW, 2021 WL 1225881, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2021); Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 19-CIV-81220-RAR, 2021 WL 1216897, at *35 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2021).
225. TransparentBusiness, Inc. v. Infobae, No. 3:20-cv-00582-MMD-WGC, 2021 WL 2670704, at
*3 (D. Nev. June 29, 2021); McHugh v. Vertical Partners W., LLC, 2:20-CV-00581-DCN, 2021 WL
1554065, at *5 (D. Idaho Apr. 19, 2021); James Lee Constr., Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
No. CV 20-68-M-DWM, 2021 WL 1139876, at *2 (D. Mont. Mar. 25, 2021).
226. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1028; see also supra Section II(B)(2).
229. 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
230. See Harrison v. Butler, 131 F.3d 146 (9th Cir. 1997); Hashiro v. General Elec. Co., 56 F.3d 71
(9th Cir. 1995); Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995); Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri
A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 272 (9th Cir. 1995).
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tional waters off the coast of Mexico.231 The defendant, Carnival Cruise
Lines, was a Panamanian corporation headquartered in Florida.232 The
plaintiff sued in Washington.233 The Court summarized Carnival’s minimum contacts with Washington:
Carnival does, however, advertise its cruises in local Washington newspapers. It also provides brochures to travel agents in Washington, which in
turn are distributed to potential customers. Carnival also periodically holds
seminars for travel agents in the State of Washington to inform them about,
and encourage them to sell, Carnival cruises. Carnival pays travel agencies a
10% commission on proceeds from tickets sold for Carnival cruises.234

The Court held these contacts satisfied the minimum contacts prong because Carnival purposefully availed itself of the laws of Washington.235
Turning to the relatedness prong, the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff’s
cause of action arose out of Carnival’s contacts with Washington.236 The
Court reached this conclusion by applying a but-for test: but for “Carnival’s
activity [in Washington], the Shutes would not have taken the cruise, and
Mrs. Shute’s injury would not have occurred.”237 The Court adopted the
but-for test used at that time by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and “implicitly
adopted” by an earlier Ninth Circuit case.238 In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected the defendant’s argument that a more stringent, proximate
cause standard should govern.239 This was the same argument Ford’s counsel made at oral argument in Ford Motor Co.,240 which the Supreme Court
ultimately rejected.241
Shute was reversed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court,242
but the but-for test remained good law in the Ninth Circuit and was applied
consistently until the recent confusion created by Ford Motor Co.243 Ironi231. 897 F.2d at 379.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 382.
236. Id. at 386.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 385.
239. Id. at 383, 385.
240. See supra Section III(B)(1).
241. See supra Section III(B)(3).
242. See generally Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991).
243. See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Burns & Wilcox Ltd., CV-19-04854-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 4039119, at
*7 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2020); Haines v. Get Air LLC, CV1500002TUCRMEJM, 2017 WL 1067777, at *9
(D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2017); Supplier’s City SA de CV v. EFTEC N.A., LLC, CV-06-2503-PHX-PGR,
2007 WL 1655989, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. June 7, 2007); Fisk v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., CV 04-45-MDWM, 2006 WL 8435896, at *5 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2006); nMotion, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 (D. Or. 2001); Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89
F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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cally, courts in the Ninth Circuit were already accommodating situations
like the one presented in Ford Motor Co. using the but-for test.
Consider National Casualty Co. v. Burns & Wilcox Ltd.,244 a breach of
contract case out of the District of Arizona that held the but-for test was
satisfied.245 There, the defendant argued the plaintiff’s claim did not “arise
from its forum related contacts because none of the alleged breaches of their
agreement . . . occurred in Arizona.”246 Therefore, the “specific acts triggering [the plaintiff’s] claim” were not forum-related activities on the part of
the defendant.247 Nonetheless, the court upheld the relatedness prong, stating, “The claims in this lawsuit can easily be said to ‘relate to’ these forum
related [activities].”248 The court clarified the but-for test is not limited to
the specific act giving rise to the lawsuit, but rather requires an examination
of the totality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.249 The Ninth
Circuit applied similar reasoning in Alexander v. Circus Circus Enterprises,
Inc.250 and Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund.251 The
logic used in these cases shows that courts in the Ninth Circuit already used
the but-for test rather liberally.
The following Subsection uses two Ninth Circuit cases to illustrate
how the but-for test can be used consistently with Ford Motor Co. In one
case, the relatedness prong would not ordinarily be met under the but-for
standard but would be met under the expansion of the relatedness test created by Ford Motor Co. In the second case, the relatedness prong would not
be met under either the but-for test or under Ford Motor Co.
B. Ford Motor Co. Can (and Should) be Used Consistently with the
But-For Test in the Ninth Circuit
This Subsection illustrates how Ford Motor Co. can operate in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit’s but-for test and argues this approach is
preferable. As argued in Section IV supra, Justice Kagan left undisturbed
the first half of the relatedness rule, which does ask about causation, and
expanded the second part of the rule, which “contemplates some other relationship.” Synthesized, the relatedness prong becomes a two-part inquiry.
244. CV-19-04854-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 4039119 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2020).
245. National Cas. Co., CV-19-04854-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 4039119, at *7.
246. Id. (ellipses in original).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (“Although these arguments have surface appeal, they focus on the wrong question. The butfor test doesn’t focus on the specific acts triggering a claim, but on whether that claim ‘arises out of or
relates to’ the defendant’s forum-related contacts.”). The court went on to list the defendant’s forum
related contacts and their relation to the contract at issue.
250. 939 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1991).
251. 784 F.2d 1392, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986).
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First, did the claim arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities,
under the jurisdiction’s preferred causation approach (here, but-for)? If the
answer to this first question is yes, the inquiry ends. If the answer is no, the
analysis turns to a second question: are the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state so expansive that they warrant application of Ford Motor Co.?
Stated differently, is the defendant corporation “systematically serv[ing] a
market” for its products or services in the forum state, or does it have
equivalent contacts with the state? If the answer to that question is yes, then
the only remaining inquiry is whether those activities relate to the plaintiff’s claims.
The following two cases illustrate how this rule will work practically,
and why it is preferable to replacing the but-for test altogether. The first
case shows how some circumstances will not satisfy the relatedness prong
under the but-for test but will under Ford Motor Co.’s expansion of the test.
The second case illustrates how other situations will fail both the but-for
test and Ford Motor Co. In this second situation, courts should use Ford
Motor Co. conservatively to avoid the pitfalls discussed in Justices Alito’s
and Gorsuch’s concurrences. However, if courts abandon the but-for test
altogether, the “real limits” discussed by Justice Kagan will slowly start to
fade.
1. Fisk v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.252
Fisk is a pre-Ford Motor Co. products liability case from the District
of Montana that arose from the death of a pilot in a helicopter crash in
Tennessee.253 The helicopter was owned by the pilot’s employer, Carson
Helicopters, which was based in Pennsylvania.254 The plaintiffs suing on
his behalf alleged design and manufacture defects caused by defendants Sikorsky and Rotair.255 Sikorsky is a Delaware corporation headquartered in
Connecticut, and Rotair is a Connecticut corporation.256 However, as the
two leading manufacturers of helicopter parts in the United States, Sikorsky
and Rotair did business in, and thus had minimum contacts with, Montana:
they advertised through brochures, prominent trade publications, and the
internet; and they supplied parts to Montana businesses and organizations,
including the Montana National Guard.257 But that was the extent of their
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

CV 04-45-M-DWM, 2006 WL 8435896 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Montana contacts. The only other connection to Montana was the pilot, who
was a Montana resident.258
The court held that both Rotair and Sikorsky were subject to specific
jurisdiction in Montana.259 With respect to the relatedness prong, the court
stated, “[T]he [d]efendants marketed their products as widely as possible.
Thus, Fisk’s claim arises out of [their] efforts to market their products in
forums such as Montana.”260 This conclusion is technically incorrect under
the Ninth Circuit’s but-for test, but the court seems to have avoided the
consequences of the but-for test by relying on its own precedent.261 If decided on a true but-for test, it would have failed the relatedness prong.
Fisk is, nonetheless, a paradigmatic case because the facts align neatly
with Ford Motor Co. The defendants never transacted with the plaintiff in
Montana, just as Ford never dealt directly with Gullett. Similarly, regardless
of whether Sikorsky and Rotair (or Ford in Ford Motor Co.) did any business in Montana, the plaintiffs would have sustained the same injuries.
Therefore, their forum-related contacts are not but-for causes of the plaintiffs’ claims, even under the liberal but-for standard used in cases such as
National Casualty.262
Because the plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of Rotair’s and Sikorsky’s forum-related activities, it is necessary to consider the second part of
the inquiry: do the defendants’ forum-related activities warrant application
of Ford Motor Co.? Here, it appears they do. Rotair and Sikorsky made a
“systematic” effort to “serve the market for” their products in Montana, as
Ford did in Ford Motor Co. Additionally, the claims relate to the defendants’ minimum contacts with Montana because, as in Ford Motor Co., the
products for which they serve a market in Montana subsequently injured
Montana residents. Therefore, the claims relate to those contacts.
Fisk is the type of case that compels courts to move to the second half
of the relatedness test to avoid an unacceptable result. Deciding a case such
as Fisk solely under the arises out of, but-for test would disturb the balance
between “treating defendants fairly and protecting interstate federalism,”
the two sets of values guiding specific jurisdiction jurisprudence.263 The
following case illustrates a situation where the but-for test fails to supply
258. Id.
259. Id. at *3.
260. Id. at *5.
261. Id. (citing Hanson v. United Instruments, Inc., 9:00-cv-00065-DWM (D. Mont. Feb. 8, 2001)).
This outcome corroborates the argument in Section IV(A) supra that courts in the Ninth Circuit were
already accommodating cases such as Ford Motor Co. using the but-for test.
262. See supra Section IV(A).
263. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021). See also
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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specific jurisdiction, and the expansion of Ford Motor Co. is rightfully inapplicable.
2. Harrison v. Butler264
Harrison was a medical malpractice action filed in the District of Arizona.265 The plaintiff, Harrison, was the surviving spouse of a patient who
was allegedly misdiagnosed in Nevada and later died in Arizona.266 The
defendant, Dr. Butler, was a Nevada-based physician. Dr. Butler examined,
diagnosed, and referred the patient in Nevada to a surgical consultant in
Arizona.267 The allegedly negligent act was that Dr. Butler should have
referred the patient to a hospital for immediate surgery instead of a consultation.268 The Court assumed, arguendo, the plaintiff could establish minimum contacts and then proceeded to discuss the relatedness prong.269 Applying the but-for test, the Court noted, “Mrs. Harrison’s claims against
these appellees would have arisen regardless of Dr. Butler’s contacts with
Arizona because the allegedly negligent acts occurred entirely in Nevada.”270 Therefore, the plaintiff could not satisfy the but-for test of the
relatedness prong.271
Harrison illustrates a case where it is appropriate to stop at the but-for
test. Here, Ford Motor Co. would be inapplicable because the defendant
physician did not have the kind of expansive contacts with Arizona,
equivalent to Ford’s “serving a market for its products” in the forum state.
Assuming the physician worked for a hypothetical company, “Doctors,
Inc.,” which was a leading medical provider in the United States and had
the types of contacts that systematically served a market for those services
in Arizona, then perhaps it would be reasonable to move to the second part
of the test and inquire whether those contacts relate to the plaintiff’s claim.
Otherwise, the balance between the defendant’s fairness and interstate federalism is undisturbed by the outcome of Harrison.
C. Ayla Is Suggestive of the Ninth Circuit’s Hasty and Incorrect
Departure from the But-For Test
Though Ayla did not address the question head-on, it suggested that
the Ninth Circuit is moving away from its but-for test in the wake of Ford
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

131 F.3d 146 (Table), No. 96-17086, 1997 WL 730259 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at *1.
Harrison, 131 F.3d at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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Motor Co.272 Ayla originated in the Northern District of California.273 Ayla,
a San Francisco-based beauty and wellness company, sued Alya Skin, an
Australian skincare company, for trademark infringement.274 Alya Skin
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.275 It argued it has “no
retail stores, offices or branches, officers, directors, or employees, bank accounts, or real property in the United States.”276 It stated that “it does not
sell products in any retail stores in the United States . . . [or] direct any
advertising toward California through online, television, and radio marketing[,] . . . [and] less than 10% of its sales have been to the United States.”277
On these facts, the district court granted Alya Skin’s motion.278
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the action “both arises out of
and relates to” Alya Skin’s contacts with the United States.279 In a footnote,
the Court hastily dismissed Alya Skin’s argument that its purported sales to
the United States are not the but-for cause of Ayla’s alleged harm: “We
clarify that our precedents permit but do not require a showing of but-for
causation to satisfy the nexus requirement . . . A narrower test is foreclosed
by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in [Ford Motor Co.].”280 The Court
cited Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB281 for its assertion that the
Ninth Circuit has never required a showing of but-for causation.282 But in
Core-Vent Corp., the relatedness prong was not at issue. The Court’s comments on relatedness were confined to one sentence: “The libel claims
clearly arose out of the publication of the articles; we thus need consider
only the first and third elements of the minimum contacts test.”283 The
Court did not write the words “but-for” in its opinion because it was obvious to everyone involved that the publication of the allegedly libelous articles were the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm. The omission of
the words “but-for” from the Court’s opinion does not suggest, as Ayla
seems to hastily imply, that Core-Vent Corp. was not decided on a but-for
standard.
The Court in Ayla ignored and misstated its own precedent. The Ninth
Circuit has required a showing of but-for causation when determining relat272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

No. 20-16214, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25921, *18 n.5 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *18 n.5.
11 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1993).
Ayla, No. 20-16214, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25921, *18 n.5.
Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 1485.
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edness for specific jurisdiction since Shute,284 and, until recently, district
courts in the Ninth Circuit followed this approach.285 Nothing about the
but-for test was, as the Court erroneously suggests, permissive. What is
permissive, conversely, is Justice Kagan’s Ford Motor Co. opinion, which
does not preclude courts from applying some causation standard for determining relatedness, but rather adds to those tests by recognizing relates to
as a second, distinct category on which to base a relatedness determination
when a corporation’s systematic and expansive contacts with the forum
state parallel Ford’s contacts with Montana.
Ayla got it wrong by, first, dismissing valid Ninth Circuit precedent
and, second, hastily interpreting and applying Ford Motor Co. when such
application was unnecessary. Federal court litigants in the Ninth Circuit
should press the court of appeals to clarify its shifting relatedness jurisprudence in a way that respects precedent and gives Ford Motor Co. the attention it deserves.
V. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed exemplify how Ford Motor Co. can be applied
harmoniously with the Ninth Circuit’s but-for test, if handled with care.
They also illustrate that using one test at the expense of the other defies the
underlying principles of personal jurisdiction.286 Indeed, these are the results Justice Gorsuch warned against in his concurrence. To concretize Justice Kagan’s “real limits,” litigants in the Ninth Circuit should continue
advocating for the but-for test. But when presented with “some other relationship”—i.e., a Ford Motor Co. situation—courts are free to examine the
affiliation between the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s forum-related
activities using the more forgiving relates to standard.
284. See, e.g., Learjet, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc., 715 F.3d 716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013); Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co. v. National Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1996).
285. See, e.g., Jackson v. Euphoria Wellness, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-03297-CRB, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 163567, *17 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 8, 2020); Miller v. Weinmann, No. 2:19-CV-2213-JCM, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 253007, *9 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2020); Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., No. 20-CV-00129DKW-RT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4431666, *28 (D. Haw. July 31, 2020); Krypt, Inc. v. Ropaar, LLC,
No. 19-CV-03226-BLF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118207, *8-9 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2020); Palumbo Design, LLC v. 1169 Hillcrest, LLC, No. 19-CV-06664-DSF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234198, *14 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2019); Birdwell & Janke, LLP v. Farkas, No. 3:18-CV-00910-YY, *23 (D. Or. Oct. 19,
2018); Deveroux v. TT Mktg., No. 1:18-CV-487-AWI-SAB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139244, *5-6 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2018); Sia v. Berhad, No. C16-1692-TSZ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60569, *9 (W.D. Wash.
April 20, 2017) (“Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to establish any causal connection[.]”); Haines v. Get Air,
LLC, No. CV-15-00002-TUC-RM (EJM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27140, *26-27 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23,
2017); Saipan Air, Inc. v. Stukes, No. 1:12-CV-00015, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26977, *18-19 (D. N.
Mar. I. Feb. 25, 2013); C.S. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, No. 13-CV-3051-TOR, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138862, *14-15 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2013).
286. Results Lucero terms “arbitrary and irrational.” See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, supra
note 155, at 26.
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